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ABSTRACT 
The article examines whether the ICC’s jurisprudence on sentencing subverts or 
adopts a victim-oriented justice and whether the Chambers’ discourses are consistent 
with the Rome Statute’s legislative history. It argues that this legislative history is an 
instructive reflection of the drafters’ goals regarding victims’ rights and justice. A 
doctrinal review of the court’s Preparatory Works and sentencing jurisprudence 
reveals a potential for a victim-oriented approach to justice.  This article thus advances 
a theory of justice for victims during the court’s sentencing practice. Ultimately, it has 
implications for our understanding of substantive rights of victims, beyond the 
procedural notions of international criminal justice. 
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Victims’ rights and their participation in international criminal prosecution has received growing 
attention in international criminal law scholarship.1 While these victims’ rights approaches have 
proliferated, there is a lack of attention to the context of sentencing, as a plausible avenue for 
victims’ justice. Yet, proper sentencing has the potential to enhance restorative justice and the 
legitimacy of the judicial institutions.2 This article offers some reflections on how to advance 
victims’ justice during the process of sentencing.  
 
The article explores normative and historical grounds that might reasonably justify the expansive 
rights of victims during sentencing. Glickman explores the nexus between sentencing and justice 
for victims, using the paradigm of retribution as a theoretical orientation.3 Ohlin’s work addresses 
the inconsistency in the sentencing procedures of international criminal tribunals, by presenting 
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a retributive approach.4 Similarly, Combs’ work explores the inconsistencies in the sentence 
practices across international and internationalised tribunals.5 To deGuzman, the narratives that 
portray offenders as ‘good or evil’ also ‘create risks of overpunishment’.6 She thus warns of the 
risk of international courts exaggerating culpability and issuing excessive sentences.7 However, 
besides the defendants’ rights, it is crucial to explore the rights of victims within the sentencing 
practices.  
 
Harmon and Gaynor argue for the clarification and re-evaluation of sentencing practices, giving 
substantial weight to the goal of deterrence.8 It is important to note that inconsistent practices, 
including sentencing can affect a court’s legitimacy in the eyes of its constituencies, including 
victims.9 Combs recommends increased local influence over sentencing practices, in order to 
promote the legitimacy of the court before such people.10 The article centralizes the role of 
victims as key constituencies within the Rome regime, thus meriting substantial consideration 
during the sentencing process.  
 
Analysis of the international criminal law sentencing jurisprudence reveals that judges have a high 
degree of discretion, which has led to the expansion of both aggravating and mitigating factors.11 
In his argument for the application of human rights principles in international criminal 
sentencing, Schabas makes empirical observations regarding sentencing practices at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).12 He is sceptical about the relevance of the tribunals’ sentencing 
practices, regarding the fundamental aggravating circumstances of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.13 In light of such critical arguments, is it important to evaluate the sentencing practices 
of the ICC. This article examines whether an expansive interpretation of aggravating factors 
reflects a victim-centred approach to justice. 
 
The article partly builds on Schabas’s human rights approach, but narrows the analysis to victims’ 
justice. Using a conceptual framework of victim-oriented justice, the article takes a theoretical 
departure from the existing scholarship. A key question here could be: is there a normative or 
historical ground that might reasonably justify the expansive rights of victims during sentencing? 
The key differential factors in the determination of sentences are the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances. The article will thus make an intuitive connection between aggravating 
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circumstances and victims’ justice, asking a second question; does an expansive interpretation of 
aggravating factors reflect a victim-centred approach to justice? 
 
Aggravating factors are the ‘additional factors attending the commission of a crime, not part of 
the criminal act per se, which ought to influence the decision to impose a lighter or a heavier 
sentence, as the case might be’.14 While deGuzman advances a normative account of the role of 
gravity in international criminal law,15 this article attempts to reframe the concept of aggravating 
factors to justify a victim-oriented approach to sentencing. It traces the victims’ discourse from 
the ICC’s legislative history in order to delineate the Chambers’ sentencing practice. As 
deGuzman explains, sentencing decisions have an impact on the legitimacy of the courts.16  
 
The article thus seeks to illustrate that a victim-oriented approach to sentencing has the potential 
to enhance the ICC’s legitimacy before its vital constituency. As argued by Marieke de Hoon, 
discrepancies between victims’ justice needs  and the courts’ practices affect the legitimacy of the 
international criminal tribunals.17 This article takes a narrative that views victims as the central 
actors within the Rome regime and the ICC.18 Scholarship within the field of victimology reveals 
that while victims’ justice is a multi-faceted concept, criminal trials provide vital symbolic 
recognition of victims and victimization.19 However, by situating justice for victims within the 
sentencing regime, this article departs from contemporary scholarship that conceptualizes victims 
within procedural and transformational notions.20  
 
In theory, the article provides an interpretative framework for the future sentencing practices at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is viewed as a multifaceted institution, serving 
interests of both domestic and international communities.21 In the sentencing context, an 
exploration of the court’s assessment of aggravating factors would be of particular importance to 
the most affected people – the victims.  
 
The article examines whether the ICC’s jurisprudence on sentencing subverts or adapts a victim-
oriented justice and whether the Chambers’ discourses are consistent with the Rome Statute’s 
legislative history. It argues that this legislative history is an instructive reflection of the drafters’ 
goals regarding victims’ rights and justice.  
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Methodologically, the article makes a critical analysis of and a reflection upon the Rome Statute’s 
legislative history and case law, in light of the theoretical framework of victim’s justice. It makes 
a critical assessment of ICC’s sentencing practice, focusing on the discourses on aggravating 
factors. As the court’s jurisprudence is still developing, the decisions are reviewed one-by-one, in 
chronological order. This approach allows for the identification of common trends in regards to 
analysis of victims’ justice. In line with the theoretical framework of this article, the Chambers’ 
approach to victims’ justice is best exemplified in cases where the chambers made elaborate 
discussions on aggravating factors. This analysis is supplemented with insights gained from the 
author’s work as a Visiting Professional in the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) at 
the ICC. 
 
The article proceeds in three sections after the Introduction. Section 2 makes a case for a 
theoretical framework of victims’ justice. First, it situates victims’ justice within the Rome regime, 
which includes substantial rights during sentencing. The article next asks whether an expansive 
interpretation of aggravating factors reflects a victim-centred approach to justice? Section 3 
critically analyses the ICC’s legislative history. It argues that the drafters’ discourses are key guides 
for incorporating  victims’ justice into the court’s sentencing jurisprudence. Section 4 examines 
selected jurisprudence of the ICC on sentencing – more specifically, where the Chambers 
interpreted the salient elements of aggravation. The author posits that the Chambers’ discourses 
on aggravating factors articulate key elements of victims’ justice, albeit without a uniform 
normative approach due to the lack of clarity in the Courts Rules of Procedure. The section 
closes with a brief reference to the jurisprudence of international tribunals in order to provide 
additional guidance for the ICC on the interpretation of aggravating factors. Finally, the article 
concludes with suggestions for how the Chambers can further assess aggravating factors, in line 
with a victim centred approach to justice.  
 
 
II. Theoretical Framework for Victims’ Justice During the Sentencing   
 
II.1 Victims’ Rights in the Rome Regime 
The fundamental element of victims as key constituencies goes to the heart of the Rome Regime. 
Victims’ rights are well articulated in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute), in addition to receiving considerable attention in court’s practice and 
jurisprudence. There are explicit references to victims' interests in the normative contexts. For 
example, the Rome Statute states that trials must be ‘conducted with full respect for the rights of 
the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses’.22 Regarding the 
application and interpretation of the ICC law under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, scholars 
argue that the wording  of internationally recognised human rights includes victims’ rights.23  
Another victim-centred approach to justice can be illustrated in the Rome Statute’s provisions on 
victims’ compensation, and Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), which are also guided by theories 
from the Victims Declaration and the van Boven Principles.24 In terms of normative scope, the 
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Chamber provides an expansive definition of victims, as ‘someone who experienced personal 
harm, individually or collectively with others, directly or indirectly, in a variety of different ways 
such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss’.25 
The court’s procedural and substantive regime on victims is widely regarded as the ‘gold 
standard’ for jurisdictions with mixed legal systems and common law.26 Nonetheless, this novel 
regime was also viewed with some scepticism, with concerns that it could ‘render the landscape 
of international criminal trials irrecognisable’.27 At both investigations and prosecution stages, the 
Prosecutor is obliged to respect the interests and circumstances of the victims.28 
Similarly, the Statute provides for procedural protection for victims during trial, to protect their 
safety, well-being, dignity, and privacy.29 More importantly, the Trial Chamber is required to take 
into consideration a host of factors, ‘including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, 
and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves 
sexual or gender violence or violence against children’.30 
In addition to the protections, the Statute allows victims to make representations and 
observations at all phases of the proceedings, where their personal interests are affected.31 In this 
context, the term “victim” refers to both applicants and those that already have a right to 
participate in the Court’s proceedings.32  
The Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the Rules) also allow victims to choose their legal 
representatives.33 For this reason, the common legal representatives who work as points of contact 
for the victims, appear in the court on their behalf and generally provide justice to their needs.34 
They work closely with the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) in order to provide 
support and advice on both procedural and substantive issues.35  
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In addition to making oral submissions at the sentencing, the victims’ legal representatives  also 
submit written observations about the nature of the sentences.36 According to Funk, there is a big 
opportunity for the victims’ representatives to elucidate the victim’s interests during the process 
of summation or closing arguments.37 Moreover, the submissions of the victims’ representatives 
have an influence on the court’s assessment of the primary sentencing factors: gravity, elements 
of aggravation and mitigation.38 In line with this dimension, the next section situates victims’ justice 
within the ambit of sentencing. More specifically, it will analyse the court’s assessment of 
aggravating factors, linking it to the victims’ experiences.  
A novel victim-centred approach to justice is illustrated through the Appeal Chambers 
interpretation of Article 8 of the Rome Statute on War Crimes in the Ntaganda Appeal case.39  
The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Chambers position that the protection against sexual 
violence includes members of the same armed forces. In effect, this expansive interpretation 
extends protection to a wide range of victims within the armed groups, including former child 
soldiers.40   
An important aspect in this case relates to the persuasive nature of the ICC’s legislative history.  
The Appeal Chamber endorsed the Trial Chambers reference to the drafting history, noting that 
‘the drafters intended these crimes [war crimes of rape and sexual slavery] to be “distinct war 
crimes”, as opposed to merely illustrations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or 
violations of Common Article 3’.41  
While some scholars are critical of this expansive interpretation of war crimes basing on the 
principle of legality,42 it can be argued that the protection of multiple categories of victims of the 
war crimes is an essential element under the Rome regime, thus justifying the use of victim-
oriented approaches in the ICC’s practices.    
In line with this dimension, the next section situates victims’ justice within the ambit of sentencing. 
More specifically, it will analyse the court’s assessment of aggravating factors, linking it to the 
victims’ experiences. 
 
II.2 Victims’ Rights in Relation to Sentencing 
Against the background of the protections and rights afforded to victims under Rome Regime, 
this sub section situates victims’ justice in the ICC’s sentencing practice. A critical assessment of 
the ICC’s sentencing practice is relevant, owing to the scholarly criticism against the international 
criminal sentencing regime.43 Ohlin’s justification for retributive justice is based on the victims’ 
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beliefs in the inherent retributive goals of the criminal process.44 Combs notes that the 
incorporation of domestic sentencing norms into international sentencing would secure the 
support of victims and other key constituencies of the international criminal courts.45   
A key initiative for victims’ justice is exemplified during the sentencing proceedings. The ICC 
conducts a distinct sentencing phase, where aggravating and mitigating factors are considered.46 
Scholars consider this ‘bifurcation’ as a ground for the development of jurisprudence.47 To 
Sloane, a distinct sentencing phase allows the development of ‘mature jurisprudence’ and ‘the 
expressive value of sentencing’.48 As argued by Ohlin:  
‘If litigants are given the opportunity to present arguments specifically tailored to the 
question of sentencing, the court will be more likely to respond with a decision that 
not only carefully considers those arguments, but also presents a coherent vision and 
detailed rationale for the handing down of a specific sentence’.49   
Similarly, scholars empathize the evidentiary role that victims play during these critical sentencing 
phase.50 Logan notes that ‘evidence relating to victims' personal traits, harm (to the direct victim, 
certainly), the number of persons a defendant has killed, and any particular cruelty shown bear 
obvious importance in both criminal culpability and punishment assessments’.51 In sum, it can be 
argued that there is an intuitive connection between sentencing phase and the desire to encourage 
detailed deliberation by the court on sentencing matters. 
This article lends support to the scholarly connections that make an intricate link between the 
ICC practice of a separate sentencing phase and the judge’s discourses in the sentences. 
Therefore, it undertakes an analysis of the Rome Statute’s provisions on aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in order to explore whether a case can be made for a victim-oriented 
approach to justice. This invites a critical analysis of and a reflection upon the relevant laws on 
aggravating factors.  
As was highlighted in the introduction, aggravating factors are the ‘additional factors attending 
the commission of a crime, not part of the criminal act per se, which ought to influence the 
decision to impose a lighter or a heavier sentence, as the case might be’.52 Article 78(1) of the 
Rome Statute  provides a non-exhaustive list of  factors to be considered when determining 
sentences: the gravity of the crime, aggravating and  mitigating factors.53 It can be assumed that 
the drafters envisioned a more elaborate guidance on sentencing under the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.  
Rule 145(2)(b) lists a range of aggravating circumstances; prior criminal convictions, abuse of 
power or official capacity, commission crimes where the victims are particularly defenceless, 
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commission of the crimes with cruelty, multiple victims and commission of the crimes with 
discriminatory motives.’54 
According to Rule 145(2)(b)(vi), the Chamber may consider as aggravating circumstances ‘other 
circumstances which, although not enumerated [in the same Rule], by virtue of their nature are 
similar to those mentioned’. Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) can thus be interpreted to mean that the 
Chambers have discretion to determine individual circumstances that are relevant in the 
sentencing process. This begs an inquiry into  the interpretation of the ‘other circumstances’  in 
sentencing.  In light of the theoretical framework  of this article, a key question relates to; whether 
a legislative interpretation of aggravating factors reflects a victim-centred approach to justice? 
 
III.  Legislative History of the Rome Regime as a Foundation for Victims’ Justice 
This  section makes a critical analysis of  the Rome regime’s legislative proposals and  preparatory 
documents. Due to the ambiguity within the Statute and Rules, reference to the Preparatory 
Works of the Rome Statute is important, as a source of law to the court.55  More importantly, the 
discussions amongst the drafters will provide an elaborate guide on the issue of aggravating factors 
in sentencing, in light of the theoretical framework of victims’ justice. 
The First Preparatory Committee did not make a full concrete discussion on issues relating to 
penalties.56 However, during the discussions on penalties, a reference was made to the law of the 
state where the crime is committed. In theory, this reference to the law of the state where the 
crime is committed, reference could suggest that the drafters were mindful of the contextual 
nature in which atrocities are committed against victims.  
During the Second Preparatory Committee in August 1996, the delegations from Australia and 
the Netherlands submitted a Working Paper on a Draft Set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
for The International Criminal Court. Regarding penalties, Rule 119(B)(i) provided for 
aggravating circumstances regarding the impact of the crime on the victims and the extent of 
damage caused by the convicted person's conduct.57 
During the  Fifth Preparatory Committee  in December 1997,the Working Group on Penalties  
made a blanket recommendation concerning sentences; ‘In determining the sentence, the Court 
shall, in accordance with the Rules of the Court, take into account such factors as the gravity of 
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person’.58 It listed an expansive but 
non-exclusive list of aggravating factors, including the impact of the crime on the victims and their 
families and the extent of harm.59 This broad approach to sentencing could suggest that the 
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drafters were mindful of the potential expansion of victimhood, that would necessitate expansive 
interpretations by the Chambers.  
It is important to note that the Rule 145(1)(c) factors were originally considered as a non-
exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  A verbatim outline of the discussions 
is relevant in order to make a case for victims’ approach to justice.60 This text also helps to show 
what ‘other aggravating circumstances’ might look like. It  was reported that: 
‘Among the factors suggested by various delegations as having relevance were: the 
impact of the crime on the victims and their families; the extent of damage caused or 
the danger posed by the convicted person's conduct; the degree of participation of the 
convicted person in the commission of the crime; the circumstances falling short of 
exclusion of criminal responsibility such as substantially diminished mental capacity 
or, as appropriate, duress; the age of the convicted person; the social and economic 
condition of the convicted person; the motive for the commission of the crime; the 
subsequent conduct of the person who committed the crime; superior orders; the use 
of minors in the commission of the crime.’61 
The same factors were emphasized in the Report of the Inter-sessional meeting from 19 to 30 
January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands.62 It can thus be assumed that the drafters were mindful 
of the importance of addressing the justice needs of a broad range of victims. Similarly, we can 
argue that the drafters were cautious not to limit the protective scope of the Rome regime, since 
it also addresses crimes committed under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 like forced 
pregnancy and sexual slavery.  
Another important forum was the  United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, held in Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998. 
Ms. Boenders, an observer for a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Children's Caucus 
International, suggested an aggravating circumstance in regard to adults who use children to 
commit crimes.63 She noted that; ‘Where adults deliberately used children to commit crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, or targeted them as victims, that should be considered an 
aggravating factor in passing sentence’.64  
The delegate from New Zealand also suggested that: ‘Using children should be an aggravating 
circumstance for those sentenced for having committed a core crime’.65 Core crime can be 
assumed to mean war crimes like conscription of children under the age of fifteen years.  From 
a victim-oriented approach to justice, the aggravating factor relating to the involvement of children 
in the commission of crimes can be considered as relevant  within the context of former child 
soldiers.  
In addition to the situations involving children, pregnancy was also suggested as an aggravating 
factor to the crime of rape. The delegate from Kuwait observed that: ‘The term "enforced 
pregnancy” in subparagraph (pb\s), should be reconsidered because rape was in any case 
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criminalized and it might be considered that pregnancy was an aggravating circumstance of rape’.66 
These are crucial factors in the prosecution of crimes related to forced marriages.  
The delegations noted that it was impossible to foresee all of the relevant aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances at that stage. They thus reserved these for the Rules.67 This proposal 
implies that the delegates envisioned that the Rules would provide a more nuanced position 
regarding the Chambers sentencing practice.  
During the drafting of the Rules, the First Preparatory Commission for the ICC reproduced the 
texts in the report of the Working Group on Penalties, indicating that it was impossible to exhaust 
all the aggravating circumstances.68 This normative flexibility can be regarded as a prism through 
which to advance victims’ justice, by considering multiple forms of aggravation and harm to 
victims.   
Another approach consistent with the victim-centred approach is illustrated during the 
discussions by the Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence held in 1999. In 
particular, the proposals  raise an important issue regarding the vulnerability of particular 
categories of victims.  The Spanish delegation made a proposal on the Rules, relating to part 7 
of the Rome Statute (Penalties). They suggested a range of aggravating circumstances including 
the commission of a crime for reward, discriminatory motives, deliberately and inhumane 
increasing of the pain of victim, abuse of power and repetition of crimes.69 
There were suggestions for aggravating factors to include situations where the victims are 
defending themselves against the perpetrators, circumstances of location, time or assistance from 
other persons which weaken the victim’s defence.70 These suggestions can be assumed to illustrate 
a victim-oriented approach to justice, that resonates with multiple humanitarian contexts where 
victims may engage in self-defence.  
Finally, the draft text of the Rules that was considered by the Preparatory Commission at its first 
to fifth sessions in 2000, adopted the current Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) which allows for an expansive 
interpretation of aggravating factors beyond those enumerated in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE).71 It can also be argued that the final text in  the RPE did not make expansive 
provisions regarding the mitigating and aggravating circumstances due to the presence of 
delegates from civil law and common law traditions.72 Nonetheless, the flexible approach taken 
by the drafters may also suggest an awareness of the evolving nature of international crimes with 
nuanced experiences of victims. 
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A victim-oriented approach to justice can be observed during the discussions on the Draft code 
of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (Part II) – including the draft statute for an 
international criminal court.73 Within the discussions on the rules for the  protection of the 
accused, victims and witnesses, the drafters made explicit reference to and included  the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (Victims 
Declaration).74  It should be noted that this Declaration provides an expansive meaning of victims 
that envisions both direct and indirect harm.75 However, the final text of the Draft Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence definition victims under Rule 85 did not include a reference to the 
Victims Declaration due to divisions between states, on whether the definition of victims should 
include legal entities and indirect harm.76   
Furthermore, the delegates proposed to extend the jurisdiction of court to include categories of 
crimes under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Victims of War 
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.77 This 
expanded jurisdiction illustrates an understanding of a wide range of victims during mass 
atrocities and armed conflict.  
Finally, another notable victim-oriented approach to justice is reflected in the wording of the Rule 
70 and 71, on evidence of sexual conduct.78 The drafters adopted special evidential principles 
that would allow for the prosecution of sexual violence committed during armed conflict.79 This 
flexible approach to prosecution is attributed to the drafters’ desire to circumvent the challenges 
faced at the ICTY and ICTR regarding the prosecution of sexual violence crimes.80  
In conclusion, the legislative history provides a key starting point for the use of a victim-oriented 
approach to justice during sentencing. The flexibility also allows the Chambers to exercise 
discretion in the assessment of aggravating factors, to include context related nuances of both 
direct and indirect harm to victims. As an example, the Preparatory Commission’s Working 
Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 1999, highlighted some factors that guided the 
Appeals Chamber in the Bemba et al Appeal.81   
In addition, the explicit reference by the drafters and delegates to normative frameworks of 
international human rights and humanitarian law standards is instructive for the Chambers 
sentencing practice, in line with a victim-oriented approach to justice. According to Bachrach, 
‘the abundance of references in the Rome Statute to the protection and rights of victims indicates 
that their concerns may finally be taken seriously on an international plane’.82    
In this regard, the next section analyses the jurisprudence of the court, to further exemplify the 
use of victims-oriented approaches to justice during the discourses on aggravating factors. 
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IV. Courts’ Assessment of Aggravating Circumstances: Victims Oriented Approach to 
Sentencing  
The following sentencing decisions of the court have been selected as they explore the element 
of aggravating factors in detail. The lack of an exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances within 
the Statute and Rules gives the chambers an opportunity to exercise wide discretion.83 The 
discussion of the chambers in these cases is vital, as it touches upon elements of victimhood like 
harm and vulnerability.84 The key question is: does an expansive interpretation of aggravating 
factors reflect a victim-centered approach to justice? 
The Lubanga case was the first judgement of the court,85 and the prosecution submitted the 
following as aggravating factors: harsh conditions and treatment in the camps, and the 
commission of sexual violence and rape, within the meaning of Rule 145(2)(b)(iii) of the Rules.86 
The rationale was that ‘the harms committed were gender based’. In addition, they argued that 
he abused his power or official capacity since the victims were particularly defenseless (in this 
case due to very young age) and affected the broader social impact of the crimes on the families 
and communities. 
Furthermore, the prosecution submitted a separate aggravating factor of discriminative motive, 
within the meaning of Rule 145(2)(b)(v), arguing that sexual violence was committed in a 
deliberately discriminative manner. This was however rejected by Trial Chamber I.87 The 
Chamber did not make any other finding on this factor. As regards to sexual violence as an 
aggravating factor, the Trial Chamber noted that: 
‘The Chamber is entitled to consider sexual violence under Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules 
as part of: (i) the harm suffered by the victims; (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour; 
and (iii) the circumstances of manner in which the crime was committed; additionally, 
this can be considered under Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) as showing the crime was committed with 
particular cruelty’88. 
In terms of interpretation, the Chamber did not consider the above elements of aggravation to 
be ‘other circumstances’ under Rule 145(2) (b) (vi).89 However, the recognition of extensive harm 
to victims of sexual violence is plausible, in light of a victim-centred approach to justice.  
With regards to the harsh conditions and treatment in the camps, the Chamber rejected the 
Prosecution’s arguments and did not take these into account as aggravating factors in the 
determination of the sentence.90 The Trial Chamber rejected the factor regarding the age of the 
children as an aggravating factor.91 As for the Prosecution’s submission that the crimes were 
committed against young children, the Trial Chamber held that the age of the children did not 
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constitute an aggravating factor. The reasoning was that this factor was already relevant for 
determining the gravity of the crimes.92 Generally, the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence 
was a subject of scholarly criticism.93  
Nonetheless, the reasoning with regards to the age of children presents a foundation for future 
analysis of aggravating elements where child victims are involved. The Appeals Chamber 
dismissed all the grounds of appeal put forward by the Prosecution and the Defence and 
confirmed the Trial Chamber’s sentencing decision.94 In sum, the Lubanga case did not make an 
expansive interpretation of aggravating factors, due to the limited scope of the Rules. This 
normative limitation suggests a need to consider the Rome Regime’s legislative history as a way 
of achieving victims’ justice. 
In the Bemba case of 2016, the Prosecution put forward two aggravating circumstances that; the 
crimes were committed against particularly defenceless victims and with particular cruelty.95 The 
Chamber’s decision is similar to that in the Lubanga sentencing case, where sexual violence was 
not considered as an independent aggravating factor. In considering the alleged aggravating 
circumstances relevant to the crimes of rape and pillaging, the Trial Chamber considered Rule 
145(2)(b)(iii) provisions, while adopting ICTY jurisprudence to include situations like the 
location of crime, for example, places of worship, hospitals, and the victims’ homes.96  
The aggravating factors also included the victims’ ages, ‘the duration and repeated nature of the 
acts, the perpetrators’ motives, and the violent and humiliating nature of the acts, including their 
public nature, and any verbal, physical, or other abuse or threats accompanying the crime’.97 The 
Trial Chamber upheld the aggravating circumstances related to the vulnerability and 
defencelessness of the crimes of rape by Bemba’s soldiers.98   
The second aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Rule 145(2)(b)(iv), was related to the 
‘particular cruelty’ with which Bemba’s soldiers committed the crimes of rape and pillaging.99  
While acknowledging the ad hoc tribunals’ position that a superior’s direct contribution to the 
crimes may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, the Trial Chamber did not consider 
the accused’s superior authority as an aggravating factor to his sentence. Instead, it was considered 
as an increase to the gravity of his culpable conduct.100 Nonetheless, the Chamber’s recognition 
of inherent vulnerabilities of defenceless victims in armed conflicts reflects a victim-oriented 
approach to justice. 
The appeal of Bemba et al. against the decision of Trial Chamber VII entitled ‘Decision on 
Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute’ of 22 March 2017’, demonstrates an expansive 
interpretation of aggravating factors.101 According to the Appeals Chamber, Bemba’s arguments 
 
92 Idem, para. 78. 
93 K. Ambos, ‘The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A 
Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues’, International Criminal Law Review, 2012-12, p. 151. 
94 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeal Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-3122, Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014. 
95 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Case 
No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, Trial Chamber III, 21 June 2016, para. 13. 
96 Idem, para. 25. 
97 Idem, para. 25. 
98 Idem, para. 43. 
99 Idem, paras. 47,57. 
100 Idem, para. 67. 
101 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., supra note 58, para. 154. 
concerned the interpretation of rule 145(2)(b)(vi) of the Rules.102  In interpreting the scope of 
‘other circumstances’, the Appeals Chamber referred to the Preparatory works of the court, 
noting that: 
‘Indeed, the language of rule 145 (2) (b) (vi) of the Rules seems to reflect a 
compromise between opposing views of States during the Rome conference, where 
some States advocated that considerable flexibility should be given to the Court, while 
other States argued for an exhaustive list to ensure more legal certainty and 
predictability.’103  
It can be argued that the explicit reference to the Rome Statute’s legislative history and 
Preparatory Works highlights a progressive approach of the Chamber towards the recognition of 
victims’ justice.  
In addition to offences against the administration of justice, abuse of privilege as an aggravating 
factor, was a key determinant in the sentencing. According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber correctly determined that Bemba’s abuse of his privileged communications ‘by virtue 
of [its] nature’, was similar’ to the factors in rule 145(2)(b)(i) to (v), and hence constitutes an 
aggravating circumstance.104 
Wrongful conduct both before and after charges, can also be considered as an aggravating factor 
under Rule 145(2)(b)(vi). According to the Appeals Chamber, conduct can give rise to an 
aggravating circumstance.105 Although offences relating to the administration of justice do not have 
an explicit connection with victims, the Chamber’s discourse in the Bemba case illustrates the 
value of the Preparatory Works of the court as key aids in the sentencing process. Crucially, the 
legislative history of the Rome regime provides a gateway for the recognition of nuanced forms 
of harm to victims, that are relevant in the sentencing process.  
The Katanga case highlights the nexus between the gravity of the crimes and aggravating factors.  
After underscoring the gravity of the crimes in the light of both article 78 of the Statute and Rule 
145(1)(c), the Prosecution listed the following four aggravating circumstances: (1) particularly 
defenceless victims; (2) particular cruelty of the commission of the crime; (3) motive involving 
discrimination; and (4) abuse of power or official capacity.106   
The Chamber discussed only the fourth aggravating factor: whether Katanga abused his authority. 
The other factors submitted by the Prosecution had already been considered in determining the 
gravity of the crimes.107 In this case, the Chamber judged that the one aggravating factor had not 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.108 This reasoning was premised on the absence of  
evidence to show that Katanga actually abused his position of power or that he used his influence 
to promote the commission of crimes.109 Perhaps the reasoning would have been different, if  acts 
of sexual violence had been proven to be widespread and systematic. The limited scope of this 
 
102 Idem, para. 154. 
103 Idem, para. 156. 
104 Idem, paras. 68,118. 
105 Idem, para. 114. 
106 Prosecutor v Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3484, Trial Chamber II, 23 May 2014, para. 70. 
107 Idem, para. 35. 
108 Idem, para. 75. 
109 Ibid. 
article doesn’t allow for a critique of this decision. This is addressed in the scholarship on sexual 
violence and the various modes of liability.110 
In the Ntaganda case, the Chamber expressly acknowledged the distinction of Rule 145(1)(b)(vi) 
factors from other aggravating circumstances, noting that: ‘The list of aggravating circumstances 
in Rule 145(2)(b) of the Rules is not exhaustive, rather, as indicated by Rule 145(1)(b)(vi), 
circumstances other than those explicitly provided in Rule 145(2)(b) (i) to (v) of the Rules may 
be considered if they are similar to them by virtue of their nature. Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) of the Rules 
does not set forth a lower threshold for seriousness.’111 From a victims’ justice perspective, the 
above reasoning illustrates a clear application of the Chamber’s discretion, as envisioned under 
the Rome regime’s legislative framework. This discretion also allows for an expansive 
interpretation of aggravating factors during sentencing, to include the victims’ nuanced 
experiences. 
Taking a similar approach to that of the Appeals Chamber in the Bemba et al. Sentencing Appeal 
Judgment, it was noted that the key element for aggravating factors is the presence of ‘sufficiently 
proximate link between the factor and the crime or crimes that form the basis of the conviction’.112 
However, the Chamber observed that legal elements of the crimes cannot be framed as separate 
aggravating factors. In this case, the fact that Ntaganda’s ‘victims were under 15 cannot, as such, 
be considered an aggravating circumstance’.113  
More specifically, the Chamber’s reasoning is quite instructive in exploring Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) 
factors, that was identified as an expansive avenue for victims’ rights. Although the Chamber did 
not explicitly frame its reasoning under Rule 145(2), it listed an expansive list of aggravating 
factors.114 More notably, situations where victims were defenceless, for example those that had 
been previously captured or detained, pregnant women, babies, young children, sick and 
disabled persons unable to flee.115  
The conduct of a commander in the presence of subordinates can also be perceived as an 
aggravating factor. Ntaganda’s individual criminal conduct amongst his juniors was an aggravating 
factor. The Chamber’s analysis emphasizes the fact  that Ntaganda committed the crimes in an 
individual capacity.116 It can be argued that individual conduct as an aggravating factor offers a 
potential for the recognition of multiple forms of victims, for example, former child soldiers 
under the custody of armed groups.  
In addition, the targeting of victims on ethnic grounds is also considered as an aggravating factor. 
The Chamber considered the fact that ‘Ntaganda intentionally targeted the victim on ethnic 
grounds, namely by reason of his identity as a Lendu, to constitute an aggravating circumstance’.117 
The Chamber further identified the following factors in aggravation: the particularly harsh 
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treatment of some of the victims, the fact that at least one of the victims was very young and the 
intentional attack on civilians.118  
With regards to sexual violence crimes, re-victimization was also considered as an aggravating 
factor. The Chamber found that: ‘[T]he repeated victimisation of some of the victims, namely 
the fact that some victims were raped more than once by the same perpetrator, or were raped by 
different perpetrators, is also considered to be an aggravating circumstance.’119  
The foregoing discussion is persuasive in light of a victim-centred approach to justice, as it allows 
for the recognition of victims of sexual violence under the custody of armed groups.   
Attacks on protected facilities like health facilities and the subsequent harm to victims is also 
considered as an aggravating factor. In this case, the Chamber noted the ‘aggravating 
circumstance that the patients present in the centre were left without medical care as a result of 
the attack’.120 Another unique aggravating circumstance relates to the recruitment and active use 
in hostilities of children under the age of fifteen. A third novel factor relates to the living 
conditions of the training camps. In this case, the treatment to which the children were 
incorporated into the military was considered as an aggravating factor.121  
From a victim-centred approach to justice, the Chamber’s discourse in the Ntaganda case 
resonates with the Rome Statue and its foundational aspirations regarding the goal of ending 
impunity. Specifically, the discourse on aggravating factors engages a wide spectrum of the ICC’s 
constituencies, as it recognizes a multitude of victim categories, beyond those directly affected by 
Ntaganda’s actions.  
The Al-Mahdi case differs from the earlier jurisprudence of the court, as it involved prosecution 
of  war crimes against cultural property.122 The Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s argument that 
Al Mahdi abused his power and official capacity as head of the Hesbah and that it was an 
aggravating circumstance.123 In its submissions, the Prosecution presented an additional 
aggravating factor; the fact that the crime affected multiple victims, under rule 145(2)(b)(iv). This 
was also rejected because it had already been taken into account by the Chamber in its assessment 
of gravity.124 
Similarly, the Chamber rejected the aggravating factor regarding the religious nature of the attack, 
since it was already considered during the assessment of the gravity of the crime.125 Nonetheless, 
the religious nature of attacks could be considered as a Rule 145(20(b)(vi) factor, if not argued 
within the ambit of the element of gravity. Overall, the Chamber did not find any aggravating 
circumstances in the Al-Mahdi case.  
From a victim-oriented approach to justice, the reparations order in the Al-Mahdi case presented 
a key question regarding  who can be considered as a victim of cultural heritage destruction.126 
The Chamber identified three categories of victims: the local community of Timbuktu, the 
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population of Mali and the international community.127  Furthermore, this expansive recognition 
of victims suggests that the Chambers are willing to make a broad interpretation of  the Rome 
Statue, in line with the emerging nuanced nature of crimes and victimization.  
The Dominic Ongwen presents an elaborate assessment of aggravating factors in line with a 
victim-centred approach to justice.128 The aggravating circumstances considered by the Trial 
Chamber were; particular cruelty, multiplicity of victims, the victims being particularly 
defenceless, and discrimination on political grounds and discrimination against women.129 The 
Chamber rejected the aggravating factor of abuse of power that was submitted by the legal 
representatives of the participating victims, due to the absence of a special lawful relationship 
between Ongwen and his victims.130 In sum, the three aggravating factors weighted heavily against 
Ongwen’s mitigating factor of his personal history, in relation to the crime against humanity of 
murder and the war crime of murder, triggering a term of 20 years of imprisonment.131 
Ongwen’s crimes of murder in the context of the attack on IDP camps were also aggravated by 
circumstances of the victims that were killed as they tried to escape or refused to carry looted 
goods.132 Under such circumstances, the Chamber reasoned that the victims of murder were 
particularly defenceless, constituting  an aggravating factor.133   
While analyzing the aggravating circumstance of the multiplicity of victims, the Chamber paid 
attention to the vulnerability of victims within Ongwen’s captivity. More notably, the difficult 
process of reintegration of victims into their  communities and psychological harm, noting that , 
‘In the assessment of the Chamber, it is important to pay sufficient attention also to the 
psychological harm done to the victims and their family members’.134 From a victim-centred 
approach to justice, the expansive analysis of the aggravating circumstance of multiplicity of 
victims under Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) was a key recognition of the extent of victimisation, beyond the 
physical harm.  
The Chamber’s reasoning regarding the aggravating factor of commission of the crime of pillaging 
with particular cruelty illustrates a clear understanding of the context in which victims were 
harmed.135 It is important to note that rather than considering cruelty as a constitutive element of 
the crime of pillaging, the Chamber considered it as an aggravating factor, in light of the fact that 
victims were killed and adducted.136   
Finally, the Chamber’s reasoning  in relation to Ongwen’s crime of conscription of children 
under the age of 15 is particularly instructive for a victim- centred approach to sentencing.  The 
Chamber followed the decision in the Ntaganda case, considering the harsh treatment of the 
conscripted children as an aggravating factor.137 More notably, the Chamber’s consideration of 
the emotional suffering of the children  as well as their families illustrates an expansive recognition 
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of victims.138 In sum, the Ongwen case highlights the need to expand the meaning and scope of 
aggravating factors in order to address the particular vulnerability of victims within specific 
humanitarian situations. The Chambers analysis also reflects a consideration for the human 
dignity of victims. Harmon and Gaynor argue that ‘the first aim of punishment must be to restore 
and reinforce respect for human dignity’, due to the dehumanizing nature of mass atrocities 
against target populations.139  
 
 V.   Conclusion 
This Article has  made a case for substantive justice for victims at the ICC, through the sentencing 
framework. First, it has sought to examine whether there is a normative ground that might 
reasonably justify the expansive rights of victims during sentencing. An analysis of the Rome 
regime’s normative framework has shown that the sentencing process is a vital forum for the 
advancement of a victim-oriented approach to justice.  
Second, the article has made a  critical analysis of, and a reflection upon, the Rome regime’s 
legislative history, in light of the theoretical framework of victims’ justice. The overall goal was to  
offer a realistic  account of the drafters’ deliberations and  reasoning, in order to make a case for 
an expansive interpretation of aggravating factors under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
While the Preparatory Works do not provide elaborate discussions on the issue of aggravating 
factors in sentencing, the discourses highlight a great significance the drafters placed on justice 
for victims. In addition, the article has shown that the drafters left Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) open ended 
as a way of granting the Chambers discretion in the assessment of sentences.  The article has 
considered this flexibility as a key entry point for the inclusion of a wider range of aggravating 
factors in line with the victims’ contextual situations.  
Finally, the article has analyzed the courts’ sentencing jurisprudence to answer the question 
whether an expansive interpretation of aggravating factors reflect a victim-centered approach to 
justice. The article has revealed some wide-ranging interpretations of aggravating factors that 
could guide future sentencing practices. Most notably, the Ntaganda case highlights critical 
elements of aggravation related to the particular vulnerability of victims that are ‘defenceless’, 
namely, detainees, pregnant women, babies, very young children, the sick and disabled persons. 
The Ongwen case is equally instructive in the consideration of aggravating elements concerning 
victims’ psychological harm and societal impact of crimes.  
In concurrence with Harmon and Gaynor, the element of human dignity should be considered 
when punishing perpetrators of mass atrocities.140 The author posits that in determining sentences 
involving gross human rights violations and mass atrocities, the judges should endeavor to align 
their discourses with the wider goals of the Rome Statute and victims’ priorities.  More generally, 
it is important that international criminal courts do not obscure the multi-faceted forms of victims’ 
vulnerabilities while making their decisions.141 Crucially, a liberal interpretation of aggravating 
factors can have a very real impact on substantive justice for victims, while expanding the extent 
to which they are visualized within the criminal justice system.  
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